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 Abortion, Persons, and Futures of Value 
Donald Wilson 
I 
In a very widely anthologized article, Don Marquis offers an argument claiming to establish 
that the “overwhelming majority of deliberate abortions are seriously immoral” (Marquis 1989, 
183). Like many who argue against abortion, Marquis assumes the immorality of killing adult 
human beings and proceeds to argue that consistency requires us to judge abortion in the same 
way. Unlike other arguments, however, Marquis’s argument focuses on the harm done in killing 
rather than on the moral status of the fetus. Familiarly, many anti-abortion arguments begin with 
the assumption that it is wrong to kill adult human beings and proceed to argue that, since the 
fetus is a human being, it must also ordinarily be wrong to kill it. In doing so, these arguments 
take for granted that adult human beings are members of the moral community entitled to direct 
moral consideration and assume that this status extends to the fetus in virtue of its shared 
humanity. The standard problem here is that we are likely to agree that it is at least conceptually 
possible that there may be other beings who could have moral rights and obligations but are not 
biologically human. If so, it cannot simply be our biological humanity that entitles us to claim 
this status. Critics of these arguments therefore claim we need a distinct term – person – to 
indicate moral standing, and argue that standard arguments emphasizing fetal humanity obscure 
this important issue and, by wrongly conflating being human and being a person, fail to establish 
the immorality of abortion.   
By focusing on an analysis of the harm done in death, Marquis claims he can avoid this 
problem and advance discussion of the issue beyond what he claims are merely dogmatic 
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assertions about the moral status of the fetus. Analyzing the harm involved in death, he suggests 
that: 
When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value that would have been part of my 
future personal life, and what I would come to value. Therefore when I die, I am deprived of 
all the value of my future. Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing wrong. 
This being the case, it would seem that what makes killing any adult human being prima facie 
seriously wrong is the loss of his or her future (Marquis 1989, p. 190). 
And, turning to the abortion issue, he claims that the implications of this analysis are clear: 
The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such that 
are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that it is sufficient to explain 
why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to 
fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong (Marquis 1989, p. 
192).    
Marquis takes this analysis of the harm in death to be obvious and emphasizes that his 
argument takes no position on the contentious issue of moral status. The central significance of 
his argument is then said to lie it its affording us a persuasive argument against abortion that 
successfully circumvents the issue of fetal humanity or personhood: 
This way of dealing with the problem of abortion seems superior to other approaches to the 
ethics of abortion because it rests on an ethics of killing which is close to self-evident, 
because the crucial morally relevant property clearly applies to fetuses, and because the 
argument avoids the usual equivocations on “human life,” “human being,” or “person” 
(Marquis, 1989 p. 202).  
Marquis goes on to claim various other advantages for this account emphasizing that it leaves 
open the possibility that it could be wrong to kill non-human beings (aliens and animals) if it can 
be shown that they experience the same kind of loss in death and that this view is therefore not 
an arbitrarily anthropocentric one. In particular, contrasting his analysis with personhood 
accounts like Mary Ann Warren’s1 and Joel Feinberg’s2 that define moral status in terms of the 
possession of higher some set of higher cognitive capacities, he emphasizes that his view readily 
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allows us to regard infanticide as directly and seriously morally wrong and argues that the failure 
of personhood accounts to do so is a central flaw in these approaches.  
Drawing on material in a reply that Marquis makes to one of his critics, I claim that Marquis 
fails to offer a plausible and generally persuasive argument against abortion. I argue that any 
claim to plausibility depends essentially on details about the value said to be lost in death - 
details that Marquis argues he can forgo. I then claim that any attempt to provide the detail 
necessary to warrant the claim of plausibility will inevitably be tantamount to an account of 
moral status and can be expected to have all the familiar problems of inclusion and exclusion 
associated with such accounts. In the absence of some specific and plausible account of the value 
lost in death, I conclude that there is no reason to think of this as a plausible general argument 
against abortion. Finally, I reconsider the standard problem infanticide poses for personhood 
accounts. I argue that Marquis’ use of this objection as a blanket criticism of personhood 
accounts is superficial but that standard indirect accounts of the wrong of infanticide offered by 
personhood models like Warren’s are likely to entail at least some restrictions on the availability 
of abortion. 
II 
In an article critical of Marquis’s “futurist account,” Gerald Paske3 agrees that the loss of a 
future like ours is morally significant and that this loss is involved in our sense of the harm done 
in killing. Paske stresses, however, that we do not think of the loss of just any future in this way: 
Marquis is correct when he offers the “unproblematic assumption” that “it is wrong to kill 
us.” But though the assumption is unproblematic, it requires explication. Indeed if we are to 
avoid “human chauvinism” and “species bias,” this unproblematic assumption must be 
explicated. Why is it that a future-like-ours is the one that counts and not – say – the future of 
a pig or a cow? (Paske, p. 363) 
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Paske claims that the answer to this question “lies in the concept of personhood” (Pojman, p. 
363) and that Marquis’ account therefore presupposes some notion of personhood in singling out 
the futures of human beings for special consideration:  
Persons, and only persons, can conceptualize a distant future in which they are a participant. 
Only persons can anticipate and deliberately shape their own future. Only persons can desire 
and possess the freedom to shape their own self, their own life, their own future ….. One 
aspect of the seriousness of death for a person is the loss of an anticipated, intended, longed-
for-future. No non-person can be harmed in this way. It is the loss of this sort of a future that 
constitutes a common – but not a universal – harm arising from death. Thus, the harms 
constituted by the loss of our future presupposes that we are persons (Paske, p. 364). 
Although he acknowledges that the quality of the future lost in death affects our judgment of 
the extent of harm suffered, Paske therefore argues that the central harm in killing consists in the 
“immediate loss of personhood” (Pakse, p. 364). He goes on to claim that, unlike Marquis’ view, 
this account can capture our sense that the wrong involved in deliberate killing is not diminished 
in cases where natural death is imminent anyway.  
It seems to me that Paske is correct in focusing on the underlying question of moral status but 
what interests me here is Marquis’ reply to Paske4 and the striking way in which it emphasizes 
the intended generality of Marquis’ argument. Discussing Paske’s criticism, Marquis stresses 
that his “future like ours” [FLO] account is deliberately agnostic on the question of what makes 
our futures valuable and specifically claims that a more detailed account is not required for the 
argument against abortion. He contrasts a future-as-a-person account [FAP] that thinks of the 
harm in killing in terms of the loss of a future involving the exercise of various higher cognitive 
capacities with a future-of-enjoyment account [FOE] that associates this harm with the loss of 
enjoyable experiences. His FLO account, he claims, is deliberately neutral between these 
alternatives and can be interpreted in either way: 
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There is room under the FLO umbrella for both the FAP and the FOE view. The FAP account 
and the FOE account each entail the FLO account, but the FLO account entails neither 
(Marquis, 1998, p. 374). 
 On either account, however, the fetus will suffer the same harm in death that an adult does, 
and both accounts will therefore entail the impermissibility of abortion. Accordingly, Marquis 
concludes that: 
 if one is interested in constructing the most plausible account one can of the wrongness of 
abortion, there is no need to commit oneself in an overly specific way on the issue of just 
what it is about our futures that makes them valuable (Marquis, 1998, p. 374).   
The claim, then, is that a FLO account of the wrong of abortion can be endorsed from within 
a variety of different perspectives, making this approach a plausible one with broad general 
appeal. Any substantive claim to general plausibility, however, now depends on the plausibility 
of the underlying views and the assumption that there is a range of promising alternative 
analyses of the central notion of a valuable future that will support Marquis’ position on 
abortion. At a minimum, the claim to plausibility rests on our having some reason to suppose that 
there is at least one generally promising analysis of the value at issue in a FLO account that 
supports his view. There are, however, good reasons to doubt that this is the case and to think, 
instead, that any claim to plausibility here must rest on precisely the detail that Marquis claims 
he can forgo.  
An account of the morality or immorality of an act seeks to justify a moral claim by appeal to 
argument, and arguments do not typically gain in plausibility by vagueness. In particular, the 
broader implications of arguments are significant, and critical discussion of them is common in 
questioning the plausibility of arguments – indeed, this is exactly the strategy that Marquis 
himself adopts in raising the specter of infanticide in discussing personhood accounts. The 
different accounts Marquis considers involve very different arguments for the impermissibility of 
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abortion, and the agreement he emphasizes masks very substantive disagreement between them, 
both with respect to the nature of the harm done and the scope of any obligations to avoid it. In 
particular, both of these accounts have implications that go well beyond the discussion of 
abortion and, in each case these implications raise significant questions about the plausibility of 
the underlying accounts. 
Take the future-of-enjoyment account. On this view, the harm done in death consists in the 
individual being deprived of a future of enjoyable experiences. The first and obvious implication 
here is one that Marquis acknowledges – while it will still be wrong to kill adult human beings 
and fetuses, it will also be wrong to kill cows and pigs. More generally, this view also clearly has 
implications that will extend well beyond concerns with killing to include a broad range of 
concerns with our general treatment of other sentient life in farming, animal experimentation etc. 
Concerns like these will require profound changes in our present patterns of life and will require 
these changes on just the same grounds as any prohibition of abortion. Whatever one makes of 
this view, these implications are obviously significant and controversial and must cast doubt on 
Marquis’ claim to the self-evident plausibility of his “future like ours” account when interpreted 
in this way.  
Equally familiar problems are just as quickly apparent in the more limiting future-as-a-person 
account. Recall that on this account it is the loss of a future involving the exercise of higher 
cognitive capacities that constitutes the harm done in death. The first and obvious difficulty here 
mirrors the infanticide problem of personhood accounts in emphasizing that FAP accounts will 
objectionably minimize the harm done in certain kinds of killing. A full FAP account will need 
to specify the relevant experiences that make up a future of value for persons (reflection, 
friendship, love, or some set of experiences unique to beings capable of higher cognitive 
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function). However these are specified, some human beings – people with severely impaired 
mental functioning, for example – are not going to be capable of these experiences and will not 
therefore be wronged if they are killed5.  In addition, Paske emphasizes that identifying the harm 
of death and the wrongness of killing with the loss of a future of experiences like this suggests 
that they are lessened in the case of older persons facing shorter futures with correspondingly 
less value. Paske claims that while we might think that the length of an expected future is 
relevant in cases where we find ourselves forced to choose between saving a young person and 
an old one, we do not think that the murder of an old person is less wrong than that of a younger 
one. 
Interestingly, Marquis replies to this objection referring to it as “Paske’s most important 
argument for the importance of the concept of a person” (Pojman, 379) and, in doing so, is 
quickly forced to provide the kind of further detail he earlier claims we can forgo. Responding to 
this problem, Marquis proposes a subjective account of the value assigned to future experiences 
according to which the value of a future is a function of the agent’s own subjective valuing of 
their experiences (presumably both the value they presently attach to things and the value they 
may reasonably be expected to attach to experiences in the future). Citing the comments of an 
aging colleague, he suggests that “people who are approaching death often remark on how much 
more they treasure life because they realize how little of it is left,” and, generalizing this remark, 
claims that “the value of each day of a person’s future from her own point of view varies directly 
with age” (Pojman, 380). The idea, then, is that differences in the length of a person’s future will 
be offset by different perceptions of the value of this future and hence, as Marquis puts it, “the 
values of our futures as a whole tend toward equality” (Pojman, 380).  
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This subjective valuing account is a problematic reply for several reasons and does not, in 
any case, solve the problem. Notwithstanding the experience of Marquis’ colleague, we might 
plausibly think that a large number of elderly people experience depression when confronted 
with immanent mortality and failing health in the latter stages of their lives. Reflecting on their 
diminished capacities and circumstances and comparing these with their past situations, they 
may well attach relatively less value to their futures. If so, this reply will do little to reduce 
worries about marginalization in this kind of FLO account. Moreover, even if the general claim 
is accepted, there will be people who do not presently value their own experiences and who 
cannot reasonably be expected to do so in the future (people who are chronically depressed or 
who for whatever reason do not value their lives). Even granting Marquis his broad claim about 
the differing values assigned to futures, these individuals will remain objectionably marginalized 
by this version of an FLO account6, again suggesting that the claim to obvious plausibility is in 
doubt.  
To be clear, these concerns obviously do not suffice to show that a FLO account of the wrong 
in killing is doomed to fail. What they do show, however, is that an account like this cannot be 
said to succeed without further discussion, and that the detail Marquis claims is unnecessary is, 
in fact, essential if the claim of plausibility is to be sustained. Any FLO account assumes some 
explanation of the moral significance of our being deprived of a specific kind of future. The FOE 
and FAP accounts are naturally suggested here because they identify a subject of loss who is 
deprived of something plausibly regarded as a good. As such, the problems with these accounts 
considered above are significant and must cast doubt on the claim to self-evident plausibility 
Marquis makes on behalf of the FLO account.  
 Abortion, persons and futures of value. Preprint, p.9 of 18 
More importantly, these problems suggest that there is every reason to think that similar 
questions of scope and inclusion will arise in relation to other possible accounts of the value of 
our futures. It is no accident that the FLO accounts considered so far seem heir to the same 
problems of scope and inclusiveness commonplace in discussions of abortion that start directly 
with the question of moral standing and seek to define this standing in terms of the possession of 
some set of capacities (sentience, consciousness, rationality, etc.). FLO accounts associate the 
harm in death with the loss of valuable future experiences and therefore presuppose some 
account of the good involved in these experiences. Any specification of this good indirectly 
confers moral status on beings capable of experiencing it (if only as loci of good realization or 
production). So, for example, if we think of the value of a future in terms of the pleasure it will 
contain, we assume that pleasure is good and beings capable of experiencing it then become the 
focus of moral concern.  
The deeper problem here is therefore that any further specification of the value at stake in an 
FLO account is tantamount to a claim to moral standing on behalf of beings capable of 
appreciating the value in question and, as such, any FLO account can be expected to confront all 
the same deep and persistent problems of scope and exclusion familiar in more direct accounts of 
moral status7. If so, there is no reason to assume that there is a range of obvious and plausible 
analyses of the central notion of a future of value that will support Marquis’ view of abortion or 
even that there is any such analysis. Instead, there is every reason to think that a FLO account 
cannot hope to make a plausible argument for any position on abortion without engaging the 
same underlying complexity and detail that confronts direct accounts of moral status. 
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III 
While Marquis’ argument might, then, gain in persuasiveness by forgoing detail, his claim to 
self-evidence and obvious plausibility masks familiar and significant difficulties and his account 
will inevitably be drawn into the same kind of deep and troubling underlying issues of scope and 
exclusion associated with more direct accounts of moral status. I want to end, therefore, with 
some remarks on one very prominent case of exclusion that Marquis uses extensively as a 
general criticism of personhood accounts of moral standing. These personhood accounts 
understand moral status in terms of the possession of some set of relatively high level cognitive 
capacities and are often said to be naturally suggested by the intuition that in order to count 
directly from the moral point of view a being must be invested in its life as a conscious project. 
Like other commentators, Marquis emphasizes that any attempt to justify abortion on the 
grounds that the fetus lacks capacities like these will also justify infanticide. Assuming we agree 
that infanticide is morally wrong, we are then to conclude that this analysis of moral status and 
the approach to an ethics of killing it entails must be defective. I have argued that Marquis’ 
account cannot forgo the kind of details likely to raise similar issues of exclusion, and I want to 
suggest in closing that his treatment of this particular case of exclusion is superficial. The 
personhood account can, I claim, accommodate significant moral and legal prohibitions on 
infanticide but, interestingly, only in a way likely also to entail some restrictions on abortion.  
Citing Joel Feinberg’s response as an example, Marquis claims that personhood strategists 
have failed consistently to deal with the serious problem of apparently licensing infanticide. 
Feinberg defends what he calls a “commonsense” view of moral status that emphasizes the actual 
possession of cognitive capacities associated with the capacity to care about the direction one’s 
life takes: 
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In the commonsense way of thinking, persons are those beings who, among other things, are 
conscious, have a concept and awareness of themselves, are capable of experiencing emotions, 
can reason and acquire understanding, can plan ahead, can act on their plans, and can feel 
pleasure and pain (Regan, 1980, p. 189). 
He acknowledges that this view has the clearly counterintuitive implication that infanticide 
will not then involve any direct moral wrong (since the early infant, like the fetus, is not 
relevantly a person endowed with moral rights). Responding to this problem, Feinberg 
emphasizes the normally very deep instinctive concern that humans have for infants in general 
and argues that the utility of this concern gives us reason to preserve it and hence to prohibit 
infanticide: 
The moral rule that condemns these killings and the legal rule that renders them punishable are 
both supported by "utilitarian reasons," that is, considerations of what is called "social utility," 
"the common good," "the public interest," and the like. Nature has apparently implanted in us 
an instinctive tenderness toward infants that has proven extremely useful to the species, not 
only because it leads us to protect our young from death, and thus keep our population up, but 
also because infants usually grow into adults, and in Benn's words, "if as infants they are not 
treated with some minimal degree of tenderness and consideration, they will suffer for it later, 
as persons."6 One might add that when they are adults, others will suffer for it too, at their 
hands. Spontaneous warmth and sympathy toward babies then clearly has a great deal of social 
utility, and insofar as infanticide would tend to weaken that socially valuable response, it is, on 
utilitarian grounds, morally wrong (Regan, 1980, p. 198). 
 In response, Marquis argues that the utility calculation could go the other way – that we 
might be better off in the long run by selectively culling infants deemed unlikely to be useful and 
productive members of society. In doing so, however, he burdens the personhood theorist in 
general with a narrowly utilitarian approach to moral reasoning that they need not share, and one 
that would be just as damning to his own view. We could, after all, interpret the FOV account in 
a similarly consequentialist vein and argue that we should promote lives likely to result in more 
valuable experiences and marginalize those unlikely to do so.   
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Like Marquis’ FOV account, the personhood model need not be understood in 
consequentialist terms and responses similar to Feinberg’s can then be seen as more robust than 
Marquis suggests. Marquis is right when he argues that the options available to personhood 
theories are limited: Given obvious developmental similarities, any account of personhood that 
excludes the fetus is also going to exclude the newborn and, very likely, early infants. The 
options for personhood accounts concerned to prohibit infanticide but permit abortion are 
therefore limited to the kind of indirect approach taken by commentators like Feinberg, Warren, 
and others. Unless, however, we take the fact that moral status is afforded only indirectly as 
being sufficient in itself to justify rejection of this approach, the adequacy of this kind of 
response will turn on the seriousness attaching to any indirectly motivated moral concern. Freed 
from the simple utilitarian model of moral reasoning that Marquis imposes on his opponents, 
these accounts have more to offer in this regard than his analysis suggests and there is therefore 
more to be said in response to this issue.   
The interest that normal adults have in the well being of children – especially those who have 
children of their own – is surely among the deepest and most profound of human interests. Both 
by nature and nurture, most normal adults are uniquely and very seriously disturbed by thoughts 
of child abuse, neglect, sexual exploitation and other harms and these concerns are not typically 
compartmentalized and limited only to their own children (it is precisely for this reason that 
charities routinely use images of children in distress to encourage giving, that dramas frequently 
feature children in horrific situations, etc.). Indeed, opponents of personhood accounts like 
Marquis rely on just this kind of intuitively deep disapprobation in claiming that the exclusion 
and marginalization of infants is a sufficient reason to reject this type of approach. 
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Any moral concern for infants motivated on this basis, though still indirect, can therefore be 
understood to be a very significant one warranting serious moral and legal censure. Moreover, 
indirect but significant moral concerns like this are not uncommon in moral thinking. Take, for 
example, the interest that many people have in religious or spiritual concerns. The fact that 
people have these interests and attach great weight to them is taken to give others moral reasons 
to respect their practices, and the respect and accommodation required of us need not be 
understood on consequentialist grounds. So, for example, it is precisely because of the deep 
significance of religion in human life that moral and legal rights to liberty or autonomy are 
typically thought to extend to especially robust and important protections in these areas of life. 
When we think of moral and legal prohibitions on infanticide as having their origin in human 
interests that are at least as deep as these, then, we can reasonably regard this kind of indirect 
account can as generating serious moral and legal concerns. 
I take it that any adequate indirect account of the moral impermissibility of infanticide must 
be grounded in a deep interest of this sort, and I assume that this is the kind of response that 
Mary Ann Warren has in mind in the postscript appended to her well-known article on abortion. 
With Warren in mind, however, one caveat is worth mentioning.  
Warren argues that the permissibility or otherwise of abortion turns on the question of 
whether the fetus is a full member of the moral community entitled to the same rights and 
protections as other members of this community. Like Feinberg, she defines moral status in 
terms of the possession of some relatively high level cognitive capacities, arguing that a being 
with direct moral status must be capable of at least one of the following: consciousness, 
reasoning, self-motivated activity, sophisticated communication, self-awareness (though not 
necessarily individual). Again like Feinberg, she immediately concedes that her account of 
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personhood will exclude newborns and early human infants and argues that they will count in 
moral deliberation indirectly on the basis of the concerns of other persons with their well-being. 
In doing so, however, Warren considers an obvious objection to this kind of indirect status reply 
according to which any indirect moral concern robust enough to motivate significant moral and 
legal censure in the case of infanticide will also extend to restrictions on abortions. After all, it is 
surely also true that a large number of people care just as deeply about the well being of fetuses 
and do not think of this interest as distinct from the concern they have for newborns and infants.  
Warren responds to this problem by arguing that unlike constraints on infanticide, restrictions 
on abortion motivated by the indirect concern of others for the well being of fetuses will 
encroach on the mother’s rights. So, for example, just as it is one thing to protect an un-owned 
wilderness area on the basis of deep concern for its preservation but quite another to force the 
owners of land to preserve it for the sake of these interests, there is a similarly important 
difference between limiting what we can do to newborns on the basis of deep concerns for their 
well-being and forcing women to carry fetuses to term against their will. Reasoning in this way, 
she concludes that we can consistently prohibit infanticide while routinely permitting abortion.  
This is, however, premature. The problem is that the adequacy of the personhood response in 
the case of infanticide turns on the strength and depth of the interest adult humans are assumed 
to have in the well-being of newborns. We do not think of infanticide as a minor wrong. We 
think of it as a deep and grievous moral wrong, and it is precisely this widely shared intuition 
that the objection leverages. An adequate response must capture this and, given the form of 
personhood accounts, they can only hope to account for this indirectly by emphasizing the 
natural depth and significance of the kind of normal human interest in the well-being of children 
described above.  
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If so, Warren cannot then simply assume that the woman’s rights will obviously always 
trump the very same profound interests in the case of many people who are also deeply invested 
in the well being of fetuses. In the first place, it is not clear that limited restrictions on the form 
that late-term abortions can take would violate the mother’s rights. We might, for example, limit 
the types of abortion procedure allowed to those that would deliver the fetus whole and healthy, 
arguing that we are justified in doing so on the grounds of the very profound interest of other 
persons in the well-being of the fetus – the same grounds we appeal to in endorsing serious 
moral and legal prohibitions on infanticide. Assuming that doing so does not entail any greater 
health risk to the mother, it is not clear that any of the woman’s rights are being violated. More 
generally, while we take rights very seriously, we do not think of them as absolute and there are 
circumstances in which we think important public interests have priority. It is, for example, 
conceivable that we might override the property holder’s rights in the above example and act to 
save the wilderness area, and there are other cases in which we restrict personal liberties when 
some important interests are at stake. If so, it is again premature of Warren to simply assume that 
the woman’s rights will always take precedence over the interests of others in the case of 
abortion. Assuming a serious commitment to respecting the woman’s rights reflected in the 
provision of open and easy access to contraception and early abortion and a clear health 
exception, these interests might reasonably be thought capable of justifying more general 
prohibitions on later abortion.  
IV 
I have claimed here that there is no reason to think of Marquis’s argument as affording us a 
persuasive general argument against abortion. Any claim to plausibility he makes on behalf of 
his account depends essentially on the further specification of the value at stake in an FLO 
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account and, given the obvious difficulties associated with the naturally suggested options 
Marquis considers, there is simply no reason to assume that there is a range of plausible accounts 
that will warrant his view. The deeper point here, I have suggested, is that any attempt to provide 
the detail required in a plausible FOV account will inevitably have the effect of defining moral 
status, and, whether we begin with this issue or confront it more indirectly in the way that FOV 
accounts must, the same troubling questions of inclusion and exclusion will arise.  
In this sense, then, it seems to me that Warren is right in suggesting that the general question 
of moral status is the fundamental issue in abortion and that we would do better to begin with 
this more basic issue and confront it directly. In doing so we must weigh intuitions we have 
about the scope of moral concerns against considered judgments about the nature and extent of 
our moral obligations. In this respect, those of us drawn to a personhood view need to take much 
more seriously the problem posed by the apparent exclusion of infants and other human beings 
lacking the relevant cognitive capacities for personhood. When we do so, however, it seems to 
me that the personhood account has more to offer than Marquis or Warren acknowledge. I have 
argued that Marquis’ use of the infanticide objection against personhood accounts of moral status 
underestimates these accounts and the weight that can attach to indirectly motivated moral 
concerns. If, however, Marquis underestimates these arguments, Warren seems guilty of 
overestimating their capacity to support her position. I have emphasized that the persuasiveness 
of the personhood response on the infanticide issue turns on the weight attributed to indirect 
moral concerns and have argued that any adequate response capable of motivating sufficiently 
serious concerns with the treatment of newborn babies and infants is likely to also permit some 
forms of restrictions on abortion services. If so, then just as there is no simple anti-abortion 
argument in Marquis, so too there is no blanket license for abortion in Warren’s argument. 
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Instead, the personhood account seems likely to yield a more nuanced account – one that is 
capable of reflecting the deep ambivalence expressed by many people about this issue who think 
of themselves as seriously committed to ensuring the availability of abortion but who are 
nonetheless also willing to impose some restrictions on the practice.  
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